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Abstract
This paper analyzes the security of a recently-proposed signal encryption scheme
based on a filter bank. A very critical weakness of this new signal encryption pro-
cedure is exploited in order to successfully recover the associated secret key.
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1 Introduction
The application of chaotic systems to cryptographical issues has been a very
important research topic since the 1990s [1–4]. This interest was motivated
by the close similarities between some properties of chaotic systems and some
characteristics of well-designed cryptosystems [5, Table 1]. Nevertheless, there
exist security defects in some chaos-based cryptosystems such that they can
be partially or totally broken [6–11].
In [12] the encryption procedure is carried out by decomposing the input
plaintext signal into two different subbands and masking each of them with
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a pseudo-random number sequence generated by iterating the chaotic logistic
map. The decomposition of the input plaintext signal x[n] is driven by
t0[n] =K0
∑
∀m
x[m]h0[2n−m], (1)
t1[n] =K1
∑
∀m
x[m]h1[2n−m], (2)
where h0, h1 are so-called “analysis filters” and K0, K1 are gain factors.
Then, the masking stage generates the ciphertext signal (v0[n], v1[n]) according
to the following equations:
v0[n] = t0[n] + α0(t1[n]), (3)
v1[n] = t1[n]− α1(v0[n]), (4)
where αi(u) = u + si[n] and si[n] is the state variable of a logistic map with
control parameter λi ∈ (3, 4) defined as follows
1
si[n] = λisi[n− 1](1− si[n− 1]). (5)
Substituting αi(u) = u+ si[n] into Eqs. (3) and (4), we have
v0[n] = (t0[n] + t1[n]) + s0[n], (6)
v1[n] = (t1[n]− v0[n])− s1[n]. (7)
The secret key of the cryptosystem is composed of the initial conditions and
the control parameters of the two logistic maps involved, i.e., s0[0], s1[0], λ0
and λ1.
The decryption procedure is carried out by doing
t1[n] = v1[n] + α1(v0[n]), (8)
t0[n] = v0[n]− α0(t1[n]). (9)
Then, the plaintext signal is recovered with the following filtering operations:
x˜[n] =
1
K0
∑
∀m
t0[m]f0[n− 2m] +
1
K1
∑
∀m
t1[m]f1[n− 2m], (10)
1 In [12], the authors use xi to denote the state variable of the logistic map. However,
this nomenclature may cause confusion because the plaintext signal is denoted by x.
Therefore, we turn to use another letter, s. In addition, we unify the representation
of xi(k) to be in the form si[n] because all other signals are in the latter form.
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Fig. 1. Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map
where f0, f1 are so-called “synthesis filters”. To ensure the correct recovery of
the plaintext signal, the analysis and synthesis filters must satisfy a certain
requirement as shown in Eq. (8) of [12]. The reader is referred to [12] for more
information about the inner working of the cryptosystem.
This paper focuses on the security analysis of the above cryptosystem. The
next section points out a security problem about the reduction of the key
space. Section 3 discusses how to recover the secret key of the cryptosystem
by a known-plaintext attack. In the last section the conclusion is given.
2 Reduction of the key space
As it is pointed out in [5, Rule 5], the key related to a chaotic cryptosystem
should avoid non-chaotic areas. In [12] it is claimed that the key space of the
cryptosystem under study is given by the set of values λi and si[0] satisfying
3 < λi < 4 and 0 < si[0] < 1 for i = 0, 1. However, when looking at the bifur-
cation diagram of the logistic map (Fig. 1), it is obvious that not all candidate
values of λi and si[0] are valid to ensure the chaoticity of the logistic map.
There are periodic windows which have to be avoided by carefully choosing
λi. As a consequence, the available key space is drastically reduced.
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3 Known-plaintext attack
In a known-plaintext attack the cryptanalyst possesses a plaintext signal
{x[n]} and its corresponding encrypted subband signals {v0[n]} and {v1[n]}.
Because {h0[n]}, {h1[n]}, K0 and K1 are public, we can get {t0[n]} and {t1[n]}
from {x[n]}. Then we can get the values of {s0[n]} and {s1[n]} as follows:
s0[n] = v0[n]− t0[n]− t1[n], (11)
s1[n] = t1[n]− v0[n]− v1[n]. (12)
For n = 0, the values of the subkeys s0[0] and s1[0] have been obtained.
Furthermore, we can obtain the control parameters by just doing the following
operations for i = 0, 1:
λi =
si[n+ 1]
si[n](1− si[n])
. (13)
In [12], the authors did not give any discussion about the finite precision about
the implementation of the cryptosystem in computers. If the floating-point
precision is used, then the value of λi can be estimated very accurately. It was
experimentally verified that the error for the estimation of λi using (13), and
working with floating-point precision, was never greater that 4 · 10−12. If the
fixed-point precision is adopted, the deviation of the parameter λi estimated
exploiting Eq. (13) from the real λi may be very large. Fortunately, according
to the following Proposition 1 [13, Proposition 2], the error is limited to 24/2L
(which means only 24 possible candidate values to be further guessed) when
s[n+ 1] ≥ 0.5.
Proposition 1 Assume that the logistic map s[n + 1] = λ · s[n] · (1 − s[n])
is iterated with L-bit fixed-point arithmetic and that s(n + 1) ≥ 2−i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ L. Then, the following inequality holds: |λ − λ˜| ≤ 2i+3/2L, where
λ˜ =
s[n+ 1]
s[n] · (1− s[n])
.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the security properties of the cryptosystem
proposed in [12]. It has been shown that there exists a great number of weak
keys derived from the fact that the logistic map is not always chaotic. In ad-
dition, the cryptosystem is very weak against a known-plaintext attack in the
sense that the secret key can be totally recovered using a very short plaintext.
4
Consequently, the cryptosystem introduced by [12] should be discarded as a
secure way of exchanging information.
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